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Abstract 
Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) asserts that people make 
decisions not on the basis of final states, but in relation to gains and losses 
experienced from a reference point. Furthermore, when making decisions under 
uncertainty, the weights assigned to outcomes and their associated utilities are not, 
as in expected utility theory, equal to the probabilities of those outcomes. Rather, 
the weights used in expected utility calculations have an “s-shaped” relationship 
with the underlying probabilities so that people have a tendency to overweight low 
probability events and underweight high probability events. Currently, there is no 
clear explanation for why this phenomenon occurs, although scholars suggest it 
may have something to do with the role that emotion plays in decision making. The 
goal of this study is to use neurological and psychological research to help create a 
plausible emotion-based explanation for the shape of the curve, as well as 
experimentally investigate the conditions under which the curve may change. 
Focusing on anxiety, I estimate decision weight functions for 62 participants, expose 
them to video clips which induce anxiety, reduce it, or are neutral (three treatment 
groups), and then experimentally estimate another decision weight curve for all 
participants. When controlling for self-reported and measured differences in anxiety 
levels, we find evidence that the decision weight function seems to shift down when 
anxiety is induced experimentally. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 Decision sciences are a rapidly growing field searching to understand how 
and why individuals make the decisions they do. While traditional economic theory 
of decision making assumes individuals are rational, much experimental evidence 
suggests otherwise (Kahneman, 2013), calling for a reexamination of decision 
making paradigms. Prospect theory developed as a leading model to describe the 
actual behavioral process used to make a decision. The theory proposed that 
instead of basing decisions on the anticipated final state of an outcome, individuals 
make decisions based on the gain or loss associated with a decision relative to a 
reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
 Faced with uncertainty, individuals place a subjective value on the 
possibilities of different outcomes. Decision weights are an important determining 
factor in a decision. Decision weights can be characterized as a function which has 
a “s-shape”. The reasoning behind this specific shape is not fully understood. While 
some evidence suggests emotion plays an integral role in the process of formulating 
decision weights (Fehr-Duda, Epper, Bruhin, & Schubert, 2011; Trepel, Fox, & 
Poldrack, 2005), their direct role in the process is not fully understood either. 
Looking to neurological and psychological research and theory may provide an 
answer. 
 The goal of this study is to use neurological and psychological research to 
develop an emotion-based model for the s-shape of the decision weight function 
and subsequently investigate the conditions under which this shape may change. I 
Effects of Anxiety on the Shape of the Decision Weight Function              Caicedo 3 
 
hypothesize that emotion plays an integral role in the process and that specific 
types of emotional states can change the decision weight function. In particular, I 
focus on the emotion of anxiety and seek to build a replicable framework for 
studying the functions or patterns associated with other emotions.  
II. Prospect Theory 
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, prospect theory emerged as a behavioral 
model counter to traditional expected utility theory. Expected utility theory presumed 
that people chose those option that maximized the expected utility associated with 
final states. It assumes a 1:1 linear weighting function, in which all individuals have 
decision weights equal to the probability. In contrast, prospect theory claims an 
individual used their own subjective value, called a decision weight, instead 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The decision weight function is assumed to be an s-
shaped curve (see Figure 1). 
The s-shaped curve produced by prospect theory produces two main effects. 
For low probability events, there is a general tendency to overweight their value 
relative to their actual worth. For example, a person plays the lottery even though 
there is a low probability of winning because they overweight the small chance that 
the could win. This is called the possibility effect. The certainty effect, on the other 
hand, shows there is a general tendency to underweight high probability events 
(Kahneman, 2013). For example, a person may settle a court case even though 
they are almost certain to win because they underestimate that high probability of 
winning. Although this pattern is observed across many experiments in the literature 
(Kahneman & Tversky,1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; 
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Neilson & Stowe, J. 2002), little explanation is offered as to why individuals tend to 
assign subjective weight in such a similar and predictable s-shape.  
III. Explanations for the S-Shaped Decision Weight Function 
Diminishing sensitivity 
 One explanation offered for the s-shaped curve is based on the idea of 
diminishing sensitivity. At the end points of the curve, events are either certain or 
impossible. Complete certainty or impossibility is simple for our brains to 
comprehend. However, as we move away from those events, and add degrees of 
uncertainty or ambiguity, we become less able to process and predict probabilities, 
causing the curve to be relatively flat in the middle (Tversky & Wakker,1995). 
Moving towards the middle of the curve, we are marginally less sensitive to changes 
in probability. It is still unclear why this phenomenon occurs or what mechanisms 
are responsible for this probability distortion. Therefore, there needs to be more 
investigation into why we have diminishing sensitivity. 
Emotion. 
 An alternate explanation for the s-shape of the decision weight curve is that it 
is affect dependent. The curve can be thought of as reflecting emotion in and of 
itself.1 The possibility effect is often associated with hope or excitement, while the 
certainty effect is associated with fear or anxiety (Kahneman & Tversky,1979; 
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). Psychological research supports this notion. Some 
studies suggest we use feelings when making decisions about risk, and those in a 
“hot” emotional state will systematically process risk differently than those who are 
                                               
1 Emotion is defined as the physiological body response to a thought or stimuli (Damasio, 1996). 
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in a “cold” rational state (Loewenstein, Weber., Hsee & Welch, 2001). The more 
vivid and salient the emotion, the more it affects the decision-making process. Many 
studies document the effect emotion has on decision making and risk taking 
attitudes. Inducing affect by using positive or negative words has been shown to 
impair performance on simple gambling task (Hinson, Whitney,Holben & Wirick, 
2006). Others show participants tend to rely more heavily on emotion to assess risk 
when in time sensitive or stressful situation (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson, 
2000), and when risk was framed in a positive emotional way, they perceived 
events as less risky.  
 Risk processing in terms of emotion lends itself to the idea that the value we 
assign to an option is a function of the emotional quality associated with it and 
quantity. Studies show that when asked to value a set of goods, participants tended 
to value the goods differently when presented in an affect rich way as opposed to in 
an affect poor manner (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004).2 For example, when asked to 
value a set of CDs, the participant gave one value, but when asked to value the 
same set of CDs after being told to imagine they belonged to a good friend who was 
moving away from the country, participants were willing to pay more for them. While 
this study produced strong evidence for the importance of emotion in decision 
making, it did specify a function to show how people assign subjective value in a 
systematic way; it only showed tendencies.  
Another study used the same principles to look at the decision weight curve 
specifically (Fehr-Duda et. al. 2011). The researchers asked participants to rate 
                                               
2 Affect rich refers to a prime which has a high emotional quality, whereas affect poor refers to something generally void of emotional vividness. 
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their mood at the time of the experiment, and they found that those in a better mood 
had greater amplitude s-shaped curves than those who were not in a good mood. 
Although this shows emotion affects the decision weight function, participants were 
simply categorized into a “good mood” or “not in a good mood”. This binary 
approach failed to specify what specific emotions were felt, how intense the emotion 
was, or how variance in emotion and intensity explains changes in decision weight 
function within and between subjects. It also fails to account for the subjectivity 
differences in self-reporting across individuals, as one person’s “good mood” could 
be a “neutral” mood to someone else.  
Neural Evidence 
Looking to neuroscience, we can see what circuitry is involved in decision 
making and compare it to the circuitry involved in emotion, in order to develop a 
clearer understanding of the mechanisms which could be responsible for shaping 
the decision weight curve. When considering decisions made in a neutral state3, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex, brain regions 
associated with reasoning and higher level executive function, have been shown to 
be involved in assigning value to choices (Chib, Rangel, Shimojo & O'Doherty, 
2009; Plassmann, O'Doherty & Rangel, 2007). Another pathway, beginning in the 
cortex and projecting to the striatum, through the globus pallidus and thalamus, and 
back to the cortex, is shown to have changes in activation associated with 
assessing risk and the ability to stop taking risk (Meder et.al., 2016). This pathway 
begins in areas associated with value encoding, and then moves through the 
                                               
3 Neutral will be defined as the state of an individual when no stimulus or emotional prime is presented.  
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reward pathway, suggesting that the brain does go through a valuation process and 
then considers the potential reward associated with that option and its outcome. 
The insula, and area associated with many functions including emotional processes, 
is also highly involved in decision making processes and has shown increased 
activation in assessing how risky a prospect is, as well as when error has been 
made after the outcome is revealed (Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008). This 
suggests a complete circuit involving valuation, risk assessment, award 
assessment, and realization of any risk prediction errors once the outcome is 
revealed.  
 The neural decision making process also shows projections from value 
encoding areas into areas associated with emotion and emotional processing, 
which suggests these processes are not separate, but instead work together to 
develop the subjective value assigned to a prospect. The amygdala, an area heavily 
associated with emotion, shows increased activation when making decisions about 
risk (Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010). The amygdala has circuits 
connecting not only to the insula, which processes risk and evaluates risk predicting 
errors, but also to the vmPFC, the value processing area. It is suggested that a 
feedback loop exists between the vmPFC and amygdala which is crucial for 
decision making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The vmPFC evaluates a thought, then 
sends this information to the amygdala. The amygdala, which is also involved in 
regulating physiological responses in the body, receives this info and causes the 
body to change state. If emotions are defined as physiological changes in the body, 
then the body produces an emotion, the vmPFC can process this change, it causes 
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a change in firing in the amygdala, which causes a change in body state and so on 
in a loop (Damasio & Bishop,1996). This is supported by clinical evidence showing 
those with lesions to the amygdala have a tendency to have poor decision making 
skills, a generally flat affect, and fail to show physiological body responses to stimuli 
(Gupta, Koscik, Bechara, & Tranel, 2011).  
Evolution 
 It is also possible evolution helped shape the possibility and certainty effects 
observed in prospect theory. Research in monkeys found they also exhibit the same 
s-shaped decision weight function as humans (Stauffer, Lak, Bossaerts, & Schultz, 
2015), suggesting humans evolved to exhibit this behavior. This would suggest the 
s-shape function must have some evolutionary advantage. It is possible that 
humans evolved to seek novelty because without this tendency, humans would 
miss potentially better outcomes. Thus, the possibility effect could be adaptive. The 
tendency encourages the undertaking of low probability actions with potential 
positive consequences and avoidance of low probability events with negative 
consequences. On the other hand, too much risk could be fatal, leading to the 
underweighting of highly likely events.  
This theory is supported by studies linking neurotransmitters to decision 
weights. Research has found high correlations between dopamine receptor density 
and differences in decision weight functions (Takahashi et. al. 2010), which 
suggests that with varying levels of dopamine present, decision weights vary in a 
correlated way. The dopamine system may play a huge role in creating the behavior 
described by prospect theory. Blocking these same receptors leads to consistently 
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riskier choices in simple gambling tasks, providing more evidence in support of 
dopamine’s role in forming decision weights. If humans have inherent circuitry 
underlying these behaviors, it provides strong support for the idea that humans 
evolved to behave in this manner.  
Dopamine Reward Prediction and the S-Shape 
 Previous discussion illuminated brain circuits implicated in the decision-
making process. Now we turn to examine a more complete theory as to how 
specific neurotransmitters could be involved in the creation of the possibility and 
certainty effects. This section is meant to show that humans are not diminishingly 
sensitive to probabilities, but rather have an innate understanding of them. 
Comparisons of expected outcomes yield overweighting and underweighting. It is a 
purposeful mechanism.  
 In building the explanation of the s-shape decision weight curve, we must 
first understand dopamine. Dopamine (DA) is established in the literature as the 
neuroeconomic literature as the neural correlate to utility (Caplin & Dean, 2008) and 
is highly important in motivating and modulating behavior. Studies show DA is 
released in varying amounts in relation to our expectations. That is, the more certain 
we are an event will occur, the less marginal DA is released when it does. 
Conversely, the less certain we are an event will occur, the greater the marginal DA 
released will be when the event happens (Schultz, 1997). Furthermore, the more 
certain we are an event will occur and it does not, the larger the decrease in DA 
firing. Similarly, there is very little marginal decrease in DA firing if we did not expect 
the event to occur and it does not. Research suggests this relationship between DA 
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release and expectations is nonlinear (Glimcher, 2011). Therefore, thinking in terms 
of utility, this would suggest there is a large utility associated with unexpected 
outcomes occurring. Also, there is a large disutility associated with highly expected 
outcomes not occurring. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 Figure 3 shows our ex post reactions to events that occur in our lives, 
suggesting experiential utility, or the utility we experience in the moment from an 
outcome, is a function of our expectations. For example, say you are taking a test. 
Assume you studied vigorously for the test and expect to get an A. When you get 
your grade back, you get an A and receive utility of point A on the graph above. 
Now let us suppose you got the test back but you got an F. You would get the 
disutility of point B. Notice, the marginal utility (MU) you recieved from getting an A 
you expected is less than the marginal disutility (MD) you receive from getting an F. 
Now suppose you did not study for the test and expect you will get an F. 
First, assume you get the test back and get an A. You get the utility of point C. Now 
assume you get a F that you expected and get utility of point D. Notice the MU of 
getting an A you did not expect is larger than the MD of getting the F you expected. 
Furthermore, the MU of the unexpected A when you did not study is larger than the 
MU of the expected A when you did study.  
As we can see from this example, our utility is not only a function of gains or 
losses, but instead is a function of how certain we are that an event will occur and if 
it does or not. The more certain we are something will occur, the less utility we 
receive when it does occur and the more disutility we will receive if it does not 
occur.  
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This ex-post phenomena influences how we weight potential outcomes in the 
ex-ante phase. When giving subjective decision weights to potential prospects in a 
decision, we consider the potential utility and disutility associated with the outcome 
vs how sure we are it will occur. This interaction causes us to overweight or 
underweight potential probabilities of outcomes in decisions. If the MU of the event 
occurring is greater than the MD of an event not occurring, we overweight the 
possibility. If the MU of an event occurring is less than the MD not occurring, then 
we underweight the possibility.  
For example, say you want to ask someone on a date. Suppose you are 
certain this person likes you and will say yes. Using this scenario, we can examine 
the decision process. Assume you are 75% sure they will say yes. The utility you 
gain if they do say yes is point A, as shown in Figure 4. If they say no, you receive 
the disutility of point B. As shown, the MD if they say no is greater than the MU if 
they say yes. Therefore, in your head, you underestimate the probability they will 
say yes, point D, when point C is the real probability the person will say yes. This 
underweighting will make you less likely to ask the person out to avoid experiencing 
the potential disutility of being wrong.  
This overweighting of small probabilities causes us to seek out that which 
maximizes MU of an event occurring is greater than the MD of the event not 
occurring, and minimize MD of an event not occurring being greater than MU of it 
occurring.  
Dopamine reward prediction error provides a good framework for explaining 
the s-shape exhibited by the decision weight function. DA is released from areas in 
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the basal ganglia, which is where the striatum of the reward circuit is situated. It 
therefore fits well into the overall decision pathways outlined. However, this 
explanation is only suitable to describe differences between individual’s decision 
weight curves, and fails to account for differences within one person. Are there 
conditions under which one individual’s decision weight function will change? Many 
of the aforementioned studies show evidence that in different emotional states, 
individuals make decisions in varying ways. Therefore, emotion must still play an 
integral role in the decision-making process. To further investigate this, I will 
extensively examine anxiety in order to determine how it could interact with the 
decision-making process. Emotional states could be responsible for changes in the 
curve, for example shifting it up or down, as welling as changing the curvature.  
IV. Anxiety 
 A large body of literature studies anxiety and its effects on individual’s social 
wellbeing as well as their decision-making patterns. As a symptom of many 
psychiatric disorders, much research has been conducted to understand how and 
why anxiety has the effects it does (Maner et al, 2007). Since anxiety is a relatively 
well understood emotion, physiologically and neurologically speaking, it is a good 
emotion for use in this study. Using anxiety, we can build a framework for 
understanding how emotion interacts to create subjective decision weights in any 
instantaneous state.  
 Anxiety as an emotion can be thought of in two ways. It is usually invoked in 
response to threats, causing heightened physiological responses and heightened 
alert in detecting the environment (Engelmann, Meyer, Fehr, & Ruff, 2015). This 
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was an evolutionary important emotion, as heightened alertness in response to a 
novel stimulus in the environment increased an organism’s chances of survival. 
Another way to interpret anxiety is the cognitive attention given to potential 
outcomes when the resolution is uncertain (Wu, 1999). Anxiety, therefore, is an 
unease surrounding the unknown, which is essential for allowing us to identify 
threats in an environment or situation.  
Anxiety and Risk 
 The effects of anxiety on risk attitudes have been extensively studied. Many 
studies find evidence supporting the notion that anxiety causes increased risk 
aversion (Raghunathan & Pham,1999; Maner et al, 2007; Robinson, Vytal, 
Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013). Studies have examined anxiety and risk attitudes in two 
ways. The first method looks for correlations in trait anxiety and differences in risk 
attitudes. Trait anxiety typically is measured by an anxiety survey to determine 
one’s level of general anxiety as a part of their personality (Leon & Revelle,1985). 
These studies then use simple gambling tasks, such as the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT) in which players choose between decks of cards with different probabilities of 
winning, or choosing between binary prospects such as winning a lottery or taking a 
certain amount (Raghunathan & Pham,1999). These studies find that high anxious 
individuals are more risk averse than low anxious individuals (Charpentier et al, 
2015). However, these studies, ignore the role of state anxiety, or the anxiety felt in 
the moment. In these experiments, there is no way to know if anxiety is being felt in 
the moment of the experiment and is indeed the reason for differences among 
individuals, or if other factors contribute to differences in results.  
Effects of Anxiety on the Shape of the Decision Weight Function              Caicedo 14 
 
 Another method for studying anxiety is to look specifically state anxiety, and 
see how the state influences risk attitudes. Examining state instead of trait anxiety 
can be a more effective way to study anxiety (Robinson et al 2013; Clark et al, 
2012). While trait anxiety may reflect personality, in controlled experiments looking 
at state anxiety, participants can be manipulated to ensure they are feeling anxiety, 
which isolates the effects of anxiety on the decision-making process. Studies 
examining state anxiety use a variety of priming and induction methods, such as 
time pressure situations, threats of electric shocks, movie clips, and many other 
methods (Clark et al, 2012; Heilman et al, 2010; van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & 
Fernández, 2009). Many of these studies also find evidence supporting the notion 
that anxiety causes increased risk aversion (Clark et al 2012, Engelman et al 2015; 
Charpentier et al 2015). However, these studies only look at relative risk taking 
attitudes, and do not seek to see how anxiety specifically plays a role in the 
valuation process and creation of decision weights. 
Neural Circuits Implicated in Anxiety 
 To gain a clearer picture of how anxiety can influence decision making, we 
can examine which pathways are affected by it, and look at how this interacts with 
neural pathways used to make decisions when not in an anxious state. Evidence 
suggests anxiety leads to decreased activity in the vmPFC and the orbitofrontal 
cortex, both areas associated with value making in the brain (Engelman et al 2015; 
Park, Wood, Bondi, Del Arco, & Moghaddam, 2016). If anxiety interferes with the 
ability to create an initial valuation, then this may lead to a change in the shape of 
the decision weight curve.  
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 Anxiety has also been shown to interfere with the reward processing pathway 
(Charpentier et al 2015, Engelman et al 2015). Anxiety decreases communication 
between the vmPFC and striatum, which implies that under an anxious state, the 
brain is having difficulty making an initial valuation and then assessing the predicted 
utility associated with the outcome. Furthermore, evidence also suggests anxiety 
leads to less communication between the vmPFC and insula (Nitschke, 
Sarinopoulos, Mackiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006). As the insula is involved in 
risk prediction and error correction, with decreased communication, the insula is not 
receiving proper inputs in order to accurately assess risk. This interference in the 
valuation, reward, and risk predicting pathway would change the ability of the brain 
to assign a decision weight to a prospect. Therefore, we would expect the decision 
weight of a prospect to differ when in an anxious state and a neutral state.  
 Anxiety is also highly associated with increased activation of the amygdala, 
which as was discussed previously, is an integral part of the decision-making 
process (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2003; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & 
Lee, 1999; Gupta, Koscik, Bechara, & Tranel, 2011). When under threat or stress, 
the amygdala increases activation (Hartley & Phelps, 2012). This causes hyper 
responsivity and attention to environment. Furthermore, physiological arousal is 
connected to anxiety. As the amygdala regulates these body states, information 
about these body states is sent to the vmPFC, heightening the feedback loop 
proposed by the SMH (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). This suggests that the 
heightened amygdala activation may lead to exaggeration of decision weights 
assigned to prospects.  
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 Evidence from the literature suggests we should see a change in the 
decision weight function when in an anxious state instead of a neutral one. If there 
is a change, then we can conclude that emotion is a critical part in the formation of 
decision weights, and an integral part in forming the subjective value we give to 
choices in our lives. Furthermore, the heightened feedback loop suggests the 
intensity with which anxiety is felt should explain some of the variation in the 
decision weight curves when in a neutral vs anxious state. To test this theory, we 
will first estimate a decision weight curve of the participant in a neutral state. For the 
entirety of the experiment, heart rate will be recorded as a proxy for anxiety. Then 
we can induce an anxious state using a movie clip, and then estimate another curve 
while in an anxious state.  
V. Methods  
For this study, 62 undergraduate students from Macalester College 
participated (21 male, 40 female, 1 other), who in compensation for their efforts 
were paid $10 for participating. The methods and procedures used in this study 
were approved by the Macalester IRB, and all participants gave informed written 
consent before engaging in the experiment.  
Materials 
 Heart rate variability (HRV) was measured using a Polar H7 heart rate 
monitor (Polar Electro, Kempele, Finland). The monitor wirelessly collected HRV 
data from the monitors and sent the data to an application (Heart Rate Variability 
Logger, Marco Altini).  Stait trait anxiety was measured using a six-item short form 
of the stait trait anxiety inventory (STAI) (Marteau & Bekker,1992). All prospects 
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were displayed on a computer, which collected data of all choices using the 
program Qualtrics. The chosen binary prospects were adapted from the original 
Cumulative Prospect Theory experiment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The 
prospect pairings used were 250-0, 100-0, 75-0, 50-0, and 25-0.  These prospects 
were spread out amongst the probability levels of 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 
and 0.95.  
Procedure  
Each participant had their HRV recorded throughout the duration of the 
experiment. To get a baseline measure of anxiety inherent in each participant, they 
answered the short form STAI. They were then asked to choose between a series 
of binary prospects, for example:  25% chance to win $150 or $50 for certain. The 
series of 35 prospects were logarithmically spaced across a spectrum of 
probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Each choice was recorded individually. 
At each probability level, a series of six descending sure outcomes were displayed, 
and the participant chose between the sure amount and the same risky prospect. 
Then, based on the chosen values, the program displayed an additional three 
prospects spaced equally between the 25% more than highest certain amount 
rejected and 25% less than the lowest certain amount accepted, in order to narrow 
down the certainty equivalent, which is the amount making an individual indifferent 
between a certain amount of money or a lottery. This process was repeated at each 
of the seven probability levels, using prospect pairs of 25-0, 50-0, 75-0, 100-0, and 
250-0, for a total of 315 questions. At the end of the 315 questions, 3 questions 
were repeated to check for consistency.  
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Participants were then randomly separated into one of three groups--an 
anxiety inducing, neutral, and anxiety reducing--which were shown then shown 
three different movie clips. The neutral group was shown a movie clip which lacked 
any emotional vividness, a video of how a pencil is made. The anxiety reducing 
group was shown a video of soothing scenes of nature with calming music. The 
anxiety inducing group was shown a video clip, a scene from the movie “Marathon 
Man” (1976), where a man is tortured via a dental procedure. This clip has been 
shown to significantly change pain perception in an unpublished study done at 
Macalester College. Studies have shown that using violent or unsettling movie clips 
increased activation in the amygdala, an important structure implicated in anxiety 
(van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernández, 2009; Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea, & 
Miu, 2010). As anxiety is an emotional response to threats or the unknown, it is 
important that the prime induces this sense of threat or fear of the unknown to be 
sure our participants feel anxiety. Other studies have shown that these types of 
movie clips induce a significantly similar pattern of activation in the amygdala as 
studies done where participants were under constant threat of a potential electric 
shock (Clark et al, 2012). As fear of an electric shock is an acceptable paradigm for 
inducing anxiety in participants, and certain kinds of movie clips can induce the 
same brain activity, I believe this is a good method of anxiety induction for this 
study.  
The participants then chose between a set of 35 binary prospects again, 
which were at the same probability levels. The pairings used in this phase were 25-
0, 75-0, 50-0, 100-0, and 250-0. Like in the previous phase, at each probability 
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level, three additional questions were presented in order to narrow down the 
certainty equivalent. At the end of the second phase, another three questions from 
the second phase were repeated to check for consistency. During this period of the 
experiment, an image from or related to the movie scene they watched would 
randomly display on the screen. The random reminder of the prime was intended to 
keep the participants in the emotional state equivalent to their assigned group and 
prevent them from habituating to the stimulus. 
At the end of the experiment, the participants were asked to answer a short 
self-reflective survey, a slight variation of the Short Form STAI, to indicate the level 
of anxiety, discomfort, or other emotion evoked by the movie clip.  
VI. Definitions of Variables and Empirical Models  
Definitions 
For each individual, the certainty equivalent was calculated for each binary 
prospect and its matching probability level. The certainty equivalent, CE, was found 
by calculating the midpoint of the highest certain amount rejected and lowest certain 
amount accepted. Then, to calculate the decision weight, I calculated the ratio of 
CE/x, where x is the non-zero prospect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). To plot the 
decision weight curve, I graphed CE/x as a function of probability. The decision 
weight, w, is equal to the ratio CE/x. For example, suppose a participant is asked to 
choose between a 25% chance to win $100 or $40 for certain, and then asked if 
what they would choose the same lottery or $30 for certain. If they say they will take 
$40 for certain, but choose the bet over $30 for certain, then their certainty 
equivalent equals $35. Their decision weight, then, is 0.35.  
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 The completed Short Form STAI produced a score measuring baseline 
anxiety on a scale of 20-80. This variable will be referred to as the AScore. After 
completion of the experiment, the participants then answered another Short Form 
STAI in relation to how the movie made them feel, which also produced a score on 
a scale of 20-80 and will be referred to as the MScore.  
HRV was recorded throughout the entire experiment. A large body of 
literature connects HRV to anxiety and emotional regulation (Dulleck, Ristl, 
Schaffner, & Torgler, 2011; Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000; 
Malik & Camm,1990), specifically in stressful situations which are mediated by the 
vmPFC and amygdala pathway (Thayer, Åhs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012).  
As both are important pathways in anxiety, I found HRV to be an appropriate 
physiological proxy for anxiety felt by the participant. The initial phase, used to 
calibrate the monitors, consisted of the period from which the participant put on the 
monitor, until the participant finished reading instructions. No heart rate data from 
this period was analyzed. The next phase, the “before” phase, began once the 
participant finished with all instructions. This phase continued until they have 
chosen between all 350 prospect pairs. The next period, called the “during” phase, 
began once they finish choosing prospects, and lasted until they finish viewing the 
movie clip. The final period, called the “after” phase, began after the movie clip 
finished, and lasted until they finished choosing between the last 315 prospects. As 
each participant completed the experiment in varying amounts of time, the most 
appropriate measure of HRV is the percentage of variable beats (pNN50).  
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Empirical Models 
If I observe behavior consistent with Prospect Theory, there should be an 
obvious probability and certainty effect, meaning the resulting decision weight 
function should be nonlinear. The function I estimated is the following polynomial: 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝 +  𝛽2𝑝
2 + 𝛽3𝑝
3        (1) 
Where p is the probability, w(p) is the decision weight, and the betas are 
coefficients. 
Under expected utility theory, we would expect that 𝛽0 = 0, 𝛽1 = 1,   𝛽2 = 0, 
and  𝛽3 = 0. However, under prospect theory, we expect that 𝛽0 ≠ 0, 𝛽1 ≠ 1,   𝛽2 ≠
0,and  𝛽3 ≠ 0. 
 In order to test the effects of the prime, within each treatment group I will test 
to see if there is a difference in the two curves before and after the priming video, as 
shown in the equation below: 
 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝 +  𝛽2𝑝
2 + 𝛽3𝑝
3 + 𝛾0𝐵 +  𝛾1𝑝𝐵 +  𝛾2𝑝
2𝐵 + 𝛾3𝑝
3𝐵 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
           (2) 
 where B is a dummy variable which equals zero before the prime and one 
after. In the anxiety group, I expect 𝛾1 ≠ 𝛾2 ≠ 𝛾3 ≠ 0, with the direction of the 
change being ambiguous. In the reducing group, I also expect 𝛾1 ≠ 𝛾2 ≠ 𝛾3 ≠ 0, and 
the curve should move in a direction opposite of the anxiety group, when controlling 
for baseline anxiety and physiological differences. Within the neutral group, we 
should see there is no change before and after the prime, so I expect  𝛾1 = 𝛾2 =
𝛾3 = 0.  
 Lastly, looking between groups, I expect to see that before the priming, all 
curves across all three groups should be relatively the same. Using Equation 3, the 
dummy variable G represents the specific control group. There should be no 
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difference between groups before the prime, which means  𝛾 = 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝛾3 = 0 =
0 .  
 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝 +  𝛽2𝑝
2 + 𝛽3𝑝
3 + 𝛾0𝐺 +  𝛾1𝑝𝐺 + 𝛾2𝑝
2𝐺 + 𝛾3𝑝
3𝐺 +  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
           (3) 
 After the prime, also using Equation 3, there should be a difference across 
groups. In comparing the anxiety group to the neutral group𝛾1 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛾2 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛾3 ≠
0. Furthermore, I expect 𝛾1 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛾2 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛾3 ≠ 0does not equal zero when 
comparing anxiety to the reducing group. 
VII. Results 
Summary Statistics 
 Examining the certainty equivalents collected before the experimental prime 
was introduced, I find there is not initially a large difference between groups. Tables 
1, 2, and 3, show the median cash equivalents of the anxiety inducing, reducing, 
and neutral groups respectively4. 
 The priming method did indeed make a difference in anxiety levels across 
groups. In looking at the variable AScore, which is the composite score of the Short 
Form STAI, the mean base level anxiety for each treatment group is relatively the 
same. Table 4 shows these differences. The control groups are relatively similar in 
their baseline anxiety, which affirms that participants with differing levels of innate 
anxious participants were randomly distributed throughout the three treatment 
groups, and therefore should not have any significant impact on group level results. 
The MScore, the self-reported anxiety the participant claimed their respective 
                                               
4  See Appendix A for presentations of mean cash equivalents.  
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treatment clip made them feel, differed across groups. Those in the anxiety group 
saw a nearly 20-point increase in anxiety levels, and also had higher anxiety levels 
than the neutral and reducing treatment groups. The reducing group saw a small 
decrease in anxiety levels. The neutral group also reported decreasing anxiety 
levels, but this is likely not because the movie made them less anxious, but rather 
due to the wording of the question. The MScore was based on how the movie made 
them feel and it is likely that the movie clip induced no anxiety, effectively lowering 
their MScore.  
 To help eliminate any speculation about discrepancies in self-reported data 
versus actual emotion felt, I measured HRV to approximate the inner activation of 
the sympathetic nervous system. Research shows lower HRV is correlated with 
higher levels of anxiety and aggression (Cacioppo et al, 2000). Table 5 shows a 
decrease in median pNN50 after the viewing of the movie clip in the anxiety group, 
indicating the movie did in fact make the participants anxious. Furthermore, we see 
an increase in pNN50 for those in the reducing group, showing that although they 
self-reported small decreases in anxiety, their physiological response showed 
greater reduction in anxiety. The neutral group showed no significant decrease in 
median pNN50, therefore, even though the group reported less anxiety their body 
state did not change. Collectively, these results show the priming method had 
effects on each group, and should be effective in creating any differences in the 
results.  
 Median certainty equivalents for post-treatment are shown in Table 6, 7, and 
8. Figure 5 shows the median CEs for each treatment group both before and after 
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treatment. There is a small difference before and after the prime in the anxiety 
group, but there does not appear to be one in the neutral or reducing group. It is 
important to note the graphs in Figure 5 show median CE’s fitted with a loess 
smoother, and no conclusions can be drawn from them. 
Analysis 
 To estimate equations 1-3 and control for differences between individuals, I 
clustered data by participant ID number. All data was transformed by a factor of 
100. Table 9 summarizes the findings of the within anxiety group analysis5. Model 1 
shows that with no other factors considered, the anxiety group shows a nonlinear 
relationship between decision weights and probabilities, consistent with the 
expectations of prospect theory. Within group analysis shows that in the anxiety 
group there is no significant effect of the treatment (p=0.141) as suggested by 
Model 3, however, this does seem to trend towards significance when controlling for 
baseline anxiety levels, as shown in Model 4 (p=0.1310). When interacting the 
treatment with each variable, Model 3 shows there likely is not a difference in 
curvature of the decision weight function before and after treatment, suggesting that 
the results of the other models are more indicative of a downward shift of the 
decision weight curve when in an anxious state rather than not.  
 As shown in Table 10, within the reducing group there are no significant 
effects of the treatment. The cluster analysis shows no shifting of the curve or 
change in curvature before and after exposure to the priming video6. Table 11 
                                               
5 See Appendix A for graphs of fitted regression values.  
6 See Appendix B for graphs of fitted regression values.  
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summarizes the analysis within the neutral group7. Interestingly, there is no 
significant effect of the prime in models 2 and 4 (p=0.22, p=0.227), however, when 
interacting the treatment with the curvature, we find there is a significant difference 
before and after the treatment video (p=0.03). Therefore, there appears to be an 
upward shift in the decision weight curves before and after treatment in the neutral 
group.  
 There also did not appear to be significant differences between treatment 
groups after the presentation of the priming video, as shown in Table 12. Looking 
between the anxiety and neutral group8, the anxiety group has a decision weight 
function which is shifted downward from the neutral group, though this relationship 
is not statistically significant across any of the models presented in Table 12. 
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a difference in curvature between the two 
groups. The anxiety group also showed no significant differences from the reducing 
group post treatment, with the regressions in Table 13 suggesting the anxiety group 
had a curve shifted upward from the reducing group, and that the anxiety group had 
a more extreme curvature9. Between the reducing group and neutral group10, the 
reducing group shows significant downward shift from the neutral group when 
controlling for differences in curvature between groups (p=0.005), although the 
differences in curvature do not appear to be significant themselves11. 
                                               
7 See Appendix C for graphs of fitted regression values.  
8 See Appendix D for graphs of fitted regression values.  
9 See Appendix E for graphs of fitted regression values.  
10 See Appendix F for graphs of fitted regression values.  
11 See Table 14. 
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 The curves are estimated along seven different probability levels. In order to 
look at the differences between the curve, I analyzed the differences along each 
point of the curve before and after treatment or across treatment group using two 
sample t-tests. Within the anxiety group, presented in Table 15, there is no 
significant difference between the points at low probabilities before and after 
treatment. However, at probability=0.75 and probability=0.95 there is a significant 
difference between the mean decision weight. Looking between the anxiety group 
and reducing group post treatment, shown in Table 16, we see that there is no 
significant difference at high or low probabilities, which is likely because both groups 
showed a downward shift from their respective baselines. However, when looking at 
the difference between the anxiety and neutral group, shown in Table 17, we see a 
significant difference between the mean decision weight at almost all estimated 
points along the curve. 
VIII. Discussion 
 The first notable finding of this study is that across all treatment groups, both 
before and after treatment, I find significant evidence of an s-shaped curve. 
Furthermore, the s-shape described by prospect theory holds under varying levels 
of state anxiety. Prospect theory is robust enough to explain decision making 
tendencies even when in emotional states such as anxiety. Anxiety does not 
change the fundamental s-shape of prospect theory into a new function, however it 
could lead to shifts in the curve or slight changes in amplitude. Regardless, this 
study supports the notion that the s-shape decision weight function inherently 
underlies decision making when faced with uncertainty.  
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 Secondly, it is noteworthy that between the neutral and anxiety groups, when 
comparing the curves on a point by point estimated basis, we see the decision 
weights are significantly different along the curve. We see that at low probabilities, 
those less than 0.5, the decision weights were significantly lower than when in a 
neutral state, and the decision weights at higher probabilities are also significantly 
lower. The lower decision weights in an anxious state show the participants value 
the lotteries less than they do in a neutral state and are consequently less likely to 
take a risk at any given probability. Therefore, in an anxious state, people are more 
risk averse.  
The results of the t-tests support the results of the regression analysis. 
Although regression analysis shows no significant change in the shape of the 
decision weight curve when in an anxious state, they do suggest some interactions 
with anxiety which warrant further investigation. Within the anxiety group, regression 
analysis shows there is a downward shift of the curve after exposure to the priming 
video, indicating the participants weighted lotteries less than their expected values. 
Therefore, in an anxious state, the results suggest participants are more risk 
averse, consistent with the literature (Raghunathan & Pham,1999; Maner et al, 
2007; Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013).  
Furthermore, when comparing across groups, we see the anxiety group 
appears slightly more curved than the neutral and reducing group, and the reducing 
group has a flatter curvature than the neutral group. More convexity of the decision 
weight curve at high probabilities indicates the participant expects a larger disutility 
if wrong. Therefore, when in an anxious state, it could be that the body anticipates a 
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larger decrease in dopamine firing if wrong, leading to the more extreme 
underweighting found in the anxiety group. Furthermore, the reducing group 
appears to have a flatter curvature post treatment compared to the anxiety group. 
As those in the reducing group exhibited more HRV, indicating more relaxation and 
emotional regulation, the body may not have been creating feedback loops which 
amplified the excitement or fear of winning and losing, leading to a flatter curve. The 
anxiety group, with a lower HRV, had poorer regulation and therefore allowed body 
states to compound (Bechara & Damasio, 2005) and lead to an exaggeration of the 
curve. However, since the results are not statistically significant, we cannot take 
these hypotheses as outright conclusions from this study, but instead perhaps as 
factors to consider or investigate in future research.  
It is also interesting to note that both the anxiety and reducing groups 
showed a downward shift in the decision weight curve relative to the neutral group 
post treatment. This seems like an unlikely outcome, as we would expect that if 
inducing anxiety moves the curve in one direction, then reducing anxiety should 
move it in the opposite direction. Several interpretations could explain this. One is 
that the prime did not work and did not induce the intended effect. However, we can 
see in the HRV data and self-reported anxiety scores that this is not the case. It 
could also mean that the decision weight curve is unaffected by emotion, however, 
literature linking risky choice to affective quality suggests this is not the case (Hsee 
& Rottenstreich, 2004). Then it is possible that the decision weight curve is more 
heavily influenced by baseline anxiety levels and an individual’s departure from that 
baseline. These differences in anxiety levels could be more potent in determining 
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one’s decision weight function than the experimental treatment. This may explain 
why in the within anxiety group analysis, shown in Table 9, the effect of the AScore 
is significant, but the effect of the treatment is not. Therefore, it may be that each 
individual has an inherent shape of their decision weight curve which varies based 
on that individual’s trait anxiety. Induction of an anxious state may exacerbate the 
shape, but does not entirely change it.  
The study had several limitations. It is difficult to keep participants in an 
experimentally induced emotional state for an extended period of time. While during 
the movie clip, key brain areas involved in anxiety, such as the amygdala, may have 
been activated (van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernández, 2009; Heilman, Crişan, 
Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010), it is likely that this effect wore off over time. We do 
see that the mean pNN50 for the anxious group is lower after the prime, but it could 
be that all the low variance occurred almost immediately after the priming video and 
increased as the experiment progressed, indicating anxiety decreased later in the 
experiment. It is also likely that the anxiety felt in the moment of the prime far 
exceeded the anxiety felt afterwards while answering questions. Although I tried to 
keep participants primed throughout the second phase of the experiment with 
random GIF images relating to their movie clip, this may not have been salient 
enough to produce significant effects. This may be why the results trend towards 
significant but are not. In the future, it may be best to study this phenomena with 
better experimental paradigm, such as continued threat of electric shock (Clark et 
al, 2012). 
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Another factor which may have limited the results I refer to as the “boredom 
factor.” To experimentally estimate a curve of 35 points, the participant had to 
answer 315 questions, both before and after watching the video. While this took 
most participants only 10-20 minutes, it is possible that they may have gotten bored 
and thus did not answer questions with honest appraisal, but did so hastily just to 
finish. In this haste, many participants indicated they held the same certainty 
equivalent regardless of probability. For example, within the anxiety group post 
treatment12, the mean certainty equivalent for a 50% chance and 75% chance to 
win $50 was $31.20. There are several instances of this in the data, or very minute 
changes in certainty equivalents which are not proportional to the changes in 
probability. While it is possible that participants may hold the same certainty 
equivalent across a range of probabilities, which would imply their decision weight 
function would be flat with steps, this is not likely and has not been found in other 
studies investigating its shape (Wu, 1999; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Fehr-
Duda et al, 2011). Therefore, the “boredom” factor may have limited my results by 
creating functions which are not representative of the participant’s real preferences.  
 Lastly, this study assumed that decision weights would change depending on 
physiological state, regardless of the affective quality tied to the question. It could 
be that if the internal state and emotional value attached to an outcome are 
independent of each other, there is not an observable effect. However, if the 
outcomes themselves have an emotional value attached to them, there may be a 
distinctive difference in how an individual weights decisions. For example, the study 
                                               
12 See Table 6. 
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asked questions with a simple lottery, and these numbers themselves are very 
neutral as emotional stimuli. However, if the question would have been worded that 
there is a 10% chance to win a trip to Disney World, or $50 for certain, this may 
have changed the value because there is a salient excitement associated with the 
thought of Disney World which may not have been associated with a numeric lottery 
of the same value. This effect, found in several studies (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), may be more important in determining decision 
weights. Therefore, it is possible decision weights may vary with the emotional 
quality induced by a potential outcome, but not with a random emotional state which 
is independent of the decision at hand.  
IX. Conclusion  
The emotional interaction with underlying decision weights warrants further 
investigation. Emotion is integral to the decision-making process, and the more we 
understand how emotions interact with the decision-making process, the better we 
will understand human behavior. Furthermore, we should continue to investigate 
why we have a tendency for probability distortion, as understanding this 
phenomenon will help to build better models of decision in uncertainty. An 
interdisciplinary approach, using neurological and psychological research, will 
continue to be important in the updating and improvement of economic models.  
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Decision Weight Function  
 
Figure 1. A decision weight curve as proposed by Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
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Figure 2. Nonlinear relationship between utility (top), disutility (bottom), and 
expectations regarding the probability of an event occurring. DU is the disutility 
associated with an event, where p is the individual's own expectation of how 
probable an event is.  
 
Figure 3. Example illustrating the utility and disutility associated with passing or 
failing a test based on expectations the individual has about how they will perform 
on it. 
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Figure 4. Example about dating used to illustrate how potential utilities associated with an 
outcome combine to form a decision weight.  
 
 
 
 
 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
25-0 4.165 5.625 6.875 13.62 15 16.88 16.88 
50-0 6.260 11.67 11.67 21.34 29.17 29.17 40.67 
75-0 5.875 9.625 17.5 33.12 40.62 42.19 62.59 
100-0 12 12 24.4 39.2 49.04 63.5 81.5 
250-0 7.5 25 45 80.2 80.2 162.5 187.5 
Table 1. Median CEs in dollars of the anxiety group before exposure to the priming video. 
Each cell represents the certainty equivalent, or the amount that makes the participant 
indifferent between the lottery and a certain amount of money. For example, if there is a p 
probability of winning $x then at $CE, the participant is indifferent between the lottery and 
the sure amount $x. For example, the top left cell can be interpreted as the following: given 
the option of a 5% chance to win $25 or $0 otherwise, or being given $4.165 for certain, the 
participant is indifferent between the lottery and the sure amount of money. 
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 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
25-0 7.5 4.125 4.585 11.19 13.120 16.88 19.24 
50-0 2.34 9.005 13.84 19.34 26.26 37 40.67 
75-0 9.625 13.12 17.5 24 41 53.75 55.9 
100-0 12 12 24.34 46.68 55.42 73.5 89.25 
250-0 25 25 43.95 85.12 129.8 187.5 200.4 
Table 2. Median CEs in dollars of the reducing group before exposure to the priming video. 
Each cell represents the certainty equivalent. 
 
 
 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
25-0 4.125 5.25 6.688 13.12 15 13.62 14.88 
50-0 9.005 11.67 19.34 25.51 27.34 37 37 
75-0 10.88 13.75 17.5 29.12 40.62 53.75 60.2 
100-0 13 19.1 33.6 46.68 52.35 73.5 81.5 
250-0 25 32.5 45.4 83.5 96.7 148.0 187.5 
Table 3. Median CEs in dollars of the neutral group before exposure to the priming video. 
Each cell represents the certainty equivalent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Group AScore MScore 
Anxiety  35.18 
(10.03968) 
 55.53 
(13.36022) 
Reducing 34.42 
(9.464377) 
31.46 
(10.21853) 
Neutral  34.67 
(7.466256) 
30.35  
(7.270122) 
 
Table 4. Mean AScore and MScore by treatment group. Standard deviations reported in 
parenthesis. 
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Group Before  After 
Anxiety 11.770 
(21.48216) 
 
8.9280 
(19.48098) 
 
Reducing 13.270 
(11.37674) 
 
16.7600 
(12.66769) 
 
Neutral 18.7800 
(16.74832) 
 
19.7400 
(11.31822) 
Table 5. Median pNN50 before and after viewing of the treatment video by treatment group. 
Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
25-0 5.2 5.625 6.745 10.52 12.19 16.88 19.14 
50-0 6.26 6.26 16 21.34 21.34 37 37.84 
75-0 3.625 9.625 17.500 33.12 33.12 43.75 53.75 
100-0 12 12 24.4 41.76 41.68 62.5 74.5 
250-0 18.5 25 42.5 69.35 106.8 129.8 162.5 
Table 6. Median CEs in dollars of the anxiety group after exposure to the priming video. 
Each cell represents the certainty equivalent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
25-0 2.812 4.585 5.875 10.42 13.120 13.12 18.0.1 
50-0 6.26 9.005 11.67 19.34 26.26 37 37 
75-0 3.625 9.625 17.5 26.62 50 53.75 60.62 
100-0 12 12 24.4 46.68 46.68 73.5 81 
250-0 7.5 25 42.5 80.2 134.8 162.5 187.5 
Table 7. Median CEs in dollars of the reducing group after exposure to the priming video. 
Each cell represents the certainty equivalent. 
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 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
25-0 5  9.29 8.125 13.12 13.12 13.12 17.56 
50-0 9.585 11.67 19.34 22.42 32 37 37 
75-0 10.88 13.75 24.12 40.62 46.25 53.75 53.75 
100-0 12 19.1 24.4 46.68 46.85 73.5 73.5 
250-0 32.5 42.5 52.5 80.2 129.8 129.8 187.5 
Table 8. Median CEs in dollars of the neutral group after exposure to the priming video. 
Each cell represents the certainty equivalent. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Graphs of median probabilities vs median decision weights for each treatment 
group, both before and after exposure to the priming video. Lines fitted with a loess 
smoother.  
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CLUSTER WITHIN ANALYSIS OF ANXIETY GROUP 
Dependent variable= w (Decision Weight) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
𝑝 1.155 1.164 1.156 1.1617 
 9.85*** 9.99*** 5.55*** 9.77*** 
𝑝2 -0.0162 -0.0164 -0.0144 -0.0163 
 -5.99*** -6.10*** -3.04*** -5.97*** 
𝑝3 1.16e-4 1.17e-4 9.98e-5 1.17e-4 
 6.36*** 6.48*** 3.28*** 6.37*** 
Before (B) - -1.8218 -0.0054 -1.870 
(B=0 before 
treatment)  -1.53 0.02 -1.57 
B ×𝑝 - - -0.0036 - 
   -0.60  
𝐵×𝑝2 - - -3.67e-3 - 
   0.60  
𝐵×𝑝3 - - 3.30e-5 - 
   0.83  
AScore - - - -0.5109 
    -3.48*** 
Intercept 7.650 8.461 6.686 26.45 
 3.50*** 4.18*** 2.87*** 4.37*** 
F Stat 84.42 69.42 83.25 79.79 
 𝑅2 0.588 0.589 0.592 0.625 
N 1440 1439 1439 1439 
Table 9. Cluster analysis of anxiety group. T statistics reported underneath coefficient value. 
*Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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CLUSTER WITHIN ANALYSIS OF REDUCING GROUP 
Dependent variable= w (Decision Weight) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
𝑝 0.9647 0.9634 1.026 0.9630 
 9.02*** 9.05*** 7.92*** 9.04*** 
𝑝2 -0.0115 -0.0115 -0.0128 -0.0115 
 -3.40*** -3.43*** -3.52*** -3.43** 
𝑝3 9.07e-5 9.05e-5 1.00e-4 9.04e-5 
 3.59*** 3.62*** 3.85*** 3.61*** 
Before (B) - -2.381 0.3856 -22.332 
(B=0 before 
treatment)  -1.21 0.23 -1.17 
B ×𝑝 - - -0.1388 - 
   -0.79  
𝐵×𝑝2 - - 2.89e-3 - 
   -0.67  
𝐵×𝑝3 - - -2.13e-5 - 
   -0.71  
AScore - - - 0.0011 
    0.36 
Intercept 7.226 8.35 7.06 4.56 
 4.78*** 4.72*** 4.34*** 0.45 
F Stat 75.29 55.48 43.19 75.99 
 𝑅2 0.604 0.6058 0.606 0.607 
N 1302 1302 1302 1302 
Table 10. Cluster Analysis results of reducing group. T statistics reported underneath coefficient 
value. 
*Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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CLUSTER WITHIN ANALYSIS OF NEUTRAL GROUP 
Dependent variable= w (Decision Weight) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
𝑝 0.9701 0.9685 1.047 0.9721 
 5.56*** 5.55*** 5.71*** 5.63*** 
𝑝2 -0.0122 -0.0122 -0.0135 -0.0123 
 -4.01*** -4.00*** -4.07*** 4.08*** 
𝑝3 8.86e-5 8.84e-5 9.70e-5 8.88e-5 
 4.75*** 4.73*** 4.86*** 4.84*** 
Before (B) - 1.8324 4.973 1.812 
(B=0 before 
treatment)  1.26 2.32** 1.25 
B ×𝑝 - - -0.1609 - 
   -1.36  
𝐵×𝑝2 - - 2.76e-3 - 
   0.88  
𝐵×𝑝3 - - -1.74e-05 - 
   -0.78  
AScore - - - -0.2207 
    -0.50 
Intercept 13.98 13.09 11.54 20.70 
 6.62*** 6.65*** 6.01*** 1.33 
F Stat 78.31 61.55 38.55 67.67 
 𝑅2 0.519 0.520 0.521 0.524 
N 1448 1448 1448 1448 
Table 11. Cluster Analysis results of reducing group. T statistics reported underneath coefficient 
value. *Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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CLUSTER ANALYSIS BETWEEN ANXIETY AND NEUTRAL GROUP 
AFTER TREATMENT 
Dependent variable= w (Decision Weight) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
𝑝 1.0658 1.0655 0.9071 1.0342 
 10.67*** 10.65*** 5.62*** 8.35*** 
𝑝2 -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0122 -0.0142 
 -6.66*** -6.67*** -4.06*** -6.11*** 
𝑝3 1.04e-4 1.04e-4 8.86e-5 1.04e-4 
 7.16*** 7.17*** 4.81*** 7.06*** 
Group (G) - -4.351 -5.325 -4.1653 
(anxiety=1)  -1.14 -1.51 -1.12 
G ×𝑝 - - 0.1808 - 
   0.87  
𝐺×𝑝2 - - -5.83e-3 - 
   -1.31  
𝐺×𝑝3 - - 4.42e-5 - 
   1.51  
AScore - - - -0.3870 
    -1.72* 
Intercept 10.61 13.51 13.98 27.02 
 5.91*** 4.37*** 6.70*** 3.31*** 
F Stat 130.25 99.25 79.13 67.67 
 𝑅2 0.549 0.554 0.528 0.524 
N 2161 2161 2157 2157 
Table 12. Cluster Analysis results of neutral group. T statistics reported underneath coefficient value. 
*Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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CLUSTER ANALYSIS BETWEEN ANXIETY AND REDUCING GROUP 
AFTER TREATMENT 
Dependent variable= w (Decision Weight) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
𝑝 1.074 1.074 0.964 1.074 
 11.42*** 11.45*** 9.15*** 11.34*** 
𝑝2 -0.014 -0.0143 -0.0115 -0.0143 
 -6.18*** -6.20*** -3.44*** -6.13*** 
𝑝3 1.05e-4 1.05e-4 9.07e-5 1.05e-4 
 6.52*** 6.54*** 3.64*** 6.49*** 
Group (G) - 1.628 1.1435 1.941 
(anxiety=1)  0.43 0.45 0.51 
G ×𝑝 - - 0.1861 - 
   1.18  
𝐺×𝑝2 - - -6.51e-3 - 
   -1.39  
𝐺×𝑝3 - - 4.21e-5 - 
   1.25  
AScore - - - -0.3165 
    -2.06** 
Intercept 7.59 6.45 7.22 17.27 
 4.71*** 2.23** 4.85*** 2.68** 
F Stat 126.60 94.93 81.62 78.00 
 𝑅2 0.580 0.581 0.584 0.599 
N 2052 2052 2011 2052 
Table 13. Cluster Analysis results between anxiety group and neutral group after exposure to priming 
video. T statistics reported underneath coefficient value. 
*Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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CLUSTER ANALYSIS BETWEEN NEUTRAL AND REDUCING GROUP 
AFTER TREATMENT 
Dependent variable= w (Decision Weight) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
𝑝 0.0094 0.0094 0.0088 0.0094 
 7.27*** 7.29*** 4.84** 7.34*** 
𝑝2 -1.15e-4 -1.15e-4 -1.08e-4 -115e-4 
 7.27*** -4.60*** -3.10*** -4.63*** 
𝑝3 8.51e-7 8.51e-7 7.95e-7 8.51e-7 
 5.20*** 5.26*** 3.43*** 5.30*** 
Group (G) - -0.0506 -0.0929 -0.0509 
(anxiety=1)  -1.20 -2.99*** -1.22 
G ×𝑝 - - 7.81e-4 - 
   0.37  
𝐺×𝑝2 - - -7.53e-7 - 
   -0.16  
𝐺×𝑝3 - - 1.12e-7 - 
   0.33  
AScore - - - -0.0005 
    -0.18 
F Stat 117.81 88.03 66.66 77.46 
 𝑅2 0.529 0.536 0.567 0.536 
N 2060 2060 2023 2060 
Table 14. Cluster Analysis results between neutral group and reducing group after exposure to 
priming video. T statistics reported underneath coefficient value. 
*Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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T-Test Comparisons of Anxiety Group Before and After Treatment 
p Mean w Before Mean w After T stat p-value 
0.05 0.124 0.146 -1.226 0.221 
0.10 0.172 0.181 -0.509 0.610 
0.25 0.263 0.269 -0.277 0.782 
0.5 0.426 0.393 1.367 0.173 
0.75 0.545 0.484 2.236 0.026** 
0.90 0.629 0.611 0.671 0.503 
0.95 0.746 0.697 1.771 0.078* 
Table 15. Within anxiety group comparison of decision weights, w, both before and after 
treatment at each probability level using two sample t-tests. *Significant at the 10% level. ** 
Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
T-Test Comparisons of Between Anxiety and Reducing Group After Treatment 
p Mean w Anxiety Mean w Reducing T stat p-value 
0.05 0.146 0.114 1.884 0.061* 
0.10 0.181 0.163 0.867 0.386 
0.25 0.269 0.231 1.700 0.090* 
0.5 0.393 0.382 0.429 0.668 
0.75 0.484 0.510 -0.831 0.406 
0.90 0.611 0.622 -0.359 0.719 
0.95 0.697 0.709 -0.376 0.707 
Table 16. Between anxiety group and reducing comparison of decision weights, w, both 
before and after treatment at each probability level using two sample t-tests. *Significant at 
the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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T-Test Comparisons of Between Anxiety and Neutral Group After Treatment 
p Mean w Anxiety Mean w Neutral T stat p-value 
0.05 0.146 0.196 -2.476 0.014** 
0.10 0.181 0.262 -3.521 0.000*** 
0.25 0.269 0.320 -2.041 0.042** 
0.5 0.393 0.441 -1.779 0.076* 
0.75 0.484 0.554 -2.472 0.014** 
0.90 0.611 0.664 -1.872 0.062* 
0.95 0.697 0.712 -0.500 0.617 
Table 17. Between anxiety group and neutral group comparison of decision weights, w, 
both before and after treatment at each probability level using two sample t-tests. 
*Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix A: Graphs of Within Anxiety Group Fitted Polynomial Regression Results 
 
Figure 1. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 9, Model 1.  
 
Figure 2. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 9, Model 2, where 
B denotes before treatment and A denotes after treatment.  
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Figure 3. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 9, Model 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of Anxiety on the Shape of the Decision Weight Function              Caicedo 54 
 
Appendix B: Graphs of Within Reducing Group Fitted Polynomial Regression Results 
 
Figure 1. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 10, Model 1.  
 
Figure 2. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 10, Model 2.  
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Figure 3. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 10, Model 3.  
Appendix C: Graphs of Within Neutral Group Fitted Polynomial Regression Results 
 
Figure 1. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 11, Model 1.  
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Figure 2. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 11, Model 2.  
 
Figure 3. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 11, Model 3.  
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Appendix D: Graphs of Between Anxiety and Neutral Group Fitted Polynomial 
Regression Results 
 
Figure 1. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 12, Model 1.  
 
Figure 2. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 12, Model 2.  
Effects of Anxiety on the Shape of the Decision Weight Function              Caicedo 58 
 
 
Figure 3. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 12, Model 3. 
Appendix E: Graphs of Between Anxiety and  Reducing Group Fitted Polynomial 
Regression Results 
 
Figure 1. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 13, Model 1. 
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Figure 2. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 13, Model 2. 
 
Figure 3. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 13, Model 3. 
Effects of Anxiety on the Shape of the Decision Weight Function              Caicedo 60 
 
Appendix F: Graphs of Between Neutral and Reducing Group Fitted Polynomial 
Regression Results 
 
Figure 1. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 14, Model 1. 
 
Figure 2. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 14, Model 2. 
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Figure 3. Graph of decision weights versus probability using fitted values of Table 14, Model 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
